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Reports
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1.
Anthrax Detection: DHS Cannot Ensure That Sampling Activities Will Be Validated. March 2007.
- "The anthrax incidents highlighted major gaps in civilian preparedness to detect anthrax contamination in buildings. GAO was asked to describe and assess federal agencies' activities to detect anthrax in postal facilities, assess the results of agencies' testing, and assess whether agencies' detection activities were validated."
Source: Government Accountability Office (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: GAO-07-687T.
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Lessons Learned :
Proceedings - Congressional Hearings, Conferences, Seminars, Workshops, etc. :
Public Health
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2.
Anthrax Detection: DHS Cannot Ensure That Sampling Activities Will Be Validated. March 2007.
- "In September and October 2001, contaminated letters laced with Bacillus anthracis were sent through the mail to two U.S. senators and members of the media. Postal facilities in New Jersey, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere became heavily contaminated. The anthrax incidents highlighted major gaps in civilian preparedness to detect anthrax contamination in buildings. GAO was asked to describe and assess federal agencies' activities to detect anthrax in postal facilities, assess the results of agencies' testing, and assess whether agencies' detection activities were validated."
Source: Government Accountability Office (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Homeland Security
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3.
Biological Research Laboratories: Issues Associated with the Expansion of Laboratories Funded by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. February 2007.
- "This report responds to your November 30, 2005, request that we provide information associated with the construction of NBLs and RBLs funded by NIAID in fiscal years 2003 and 2005. Your questions covered requirements and guidance for these laboratories, funding award factors, communication with the public, and research agendas."
Source: Government Accountability Office (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: GAO-07-333R.
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Lessons Learned :
Public Health
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4.
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress. February 2007.
- “This report will outline the organizational structure of The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, describe its mission, and report the funding DHS has received for construction of its facility. It will then discuss select policy issues, such as funding for NBACC facility construction, oversight of NBACC research, and the potential for duplication of federal effort between NBACC and other agencies.”
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), United States (All by Source). Report Number: RL32891.
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Proceedings - Congressional Hearings, Conferences, Seminars, Workshops, etc.
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5.
Anthrax: Federal Agencies Have Taken Some Steps to Validate Sampling Methods and to Develop a Next-Generation Anthrax Vaccine. April 2006.
- This report discusses "(1) the problems we identified with the anthrax detection methods and the licensed anthrax vaccine, (2) recommendations we made, (3) the extent to which federal agencies have taken corrective actions, and (4) what remains to be done."
Source: Government Accountability Office (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: GAO-06-756T.
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6.
Analysis of Department of Defense Plans and Responses to Three Potential Anthrax Incidents in March 2005: Executive Summary. 2006.
- This report discusses "three potential anthrax-related incidents that occurred within Department of Defense (DoD) mail facilities in northern Virginia and Washington, D.C., during 14–18 March 2005." "This report examines each of these incidents, analyzes the adequacy of plans and actions, makes recommendations for each, and concludes with an analysis of the larger crosscutting issues that may be important to preparedness for and response to future biological incidents departmentwide."
Source: RAND (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Emergency Management :
National Security
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7.
Anthrax-Contaminated Facilities: Preparations and a Standard for Remediation. December 2005.
- This report discusses "background information on the 2001 anthrax incidents and federal preparedness plans, but it focuses primarily on preparations for future remediations and considerations for setting a remediation standard."
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), United States (All by Source). Report Number: RL33191.
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8.
Critical Infrastructure Protection in the National Capital Region: Risk-Based Foundations for Resilience and Sustainability, Final Report, Volume 18: Epidemiology of Transportation Systems and Bioterrorism. September 2005.
- “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Nation Capital Region: Risk-Based Foundations for Resilience and Sustainability” is the final report of the National Capital Region (NCR) Critical Infrastructure Project, prepared by the University Consortium for Infrastructure Protection, managed by the Critical Infrastructure Protection Program, George Mason University. This volume “identifies a set of concerns and possible solutions” to bioterrorism attacks in the NCR and “is the result of a review of relevant events, search of scientific and technical materials, inputs from multidisciplinary expert workshops, and modeling of the impact of a plume dispersion in the NCR area.”
Source: Critical Infrastructure Protection Program, George Mason University School of Law (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Critical Infrastructure Protection :
Transportation Security
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9.
One Year Later: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Project Bioshield. July 2005.
- "In November 2004, HHS awarded a contract to VaxGen for up to 75 million doses of a new generation anthrax rPA vaccine, and in May awarded a contract for 5 million doses of the existing FDA licensed anthrax vaccine produced by BioPort Corp. Additionally, HHS awarded a contract for pediatric potassium iodide in March of this year for inclusion within the Strategic National Stockpile. But in spite of these efforts, there remains some concern as to HHS's moving too slowly to award contracts. Among the questions we are going to ask today: How do we prepare against the threat of bioterrorism while waiting for new countermeasures to be researched and developed? Are we adequately linking threat assessments to the procurement of appropriate countermeasures? And most importantly, are we safer now than we were before BioShield was enacted?"
Source: Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: 109-59.
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Proceedings - Congressional Hearings, Conferences, Seminars, Workshops, etc. :
Public Health
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10.
Anthrax Detection: Agencies Need to Validate Sampling Activities to Increase Confidence in Negative Results. April 2005.
- "In September and October 2001, letters laced with Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) spores were sent through the mail to two U.S. senators and to members of the media. These letters led to the first U.S. cases of anthrax disease related to bioterrorism. In all, 22 individuals, in four states and Washington, D.C., contracted anthrax disease; 5 died. These cases prompted the Subcommittee to ask GAO to describe and assess federal agencies' activities to detect anthrax in postal facilities, assess the results of agencies' testing, and assess whether agencies' detection activities were validated."
Source: Government Accountability Office (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: GAO-05-493.
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Proceedings - Congressional Hearings, Conferences, Seminars, Workshops, etc.
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11.
Bayes, Bugs, and Bioterrorists: Lessons Learned from the Anthrax Attacks. April 2005.
- This report discusses "a risk- and decision-based framework--derived from the field of Bayesian statistics--for developing strategies that facilitate managing the risks of biological agents. The framework recognizes the significantly different attributes of potential biological weapons and offers a strategy for improving communication to effectively coordinate national biopreparedness efforts. The framework identifies generic decisions related to routine immunization, response planning, stockpiling vaccines and therapeutic agents, surveillance choices, containment, emergency response training, research, media and communications preparations, information management, and policy development. This paper provides a straw man to be used in wargames, exercises, practices, etc., at all levels of government."
Source: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Lessons Learned
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12.
Anthrax Detection: Agencies Need to Validate Sampling Activities in Order to Increase Confidence in Negative Results. March 2005.
- This GAO report discusses "federal agencies' activities to detect anthrax contamination in the postal facilities," "the results of the federal agencies' testing in the postal facilities," and "whether agencies' activities were validated and, if not, discuss any issues that arose from the lack of validation and any actions they took to address these issues."
Source: Government Accountability Office (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: GAO-05-251. Large File: 3.8+ Mb.
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense
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13.
U.S. Postal Service: Better Guidance is Needed to Ensure an Appropriate Response to Anthrax Contamination. September 2004.
- This report discusses "(1) the factors considered in deciding whether to close the five facilities, (2) the information communicated to postal employees about health risk and the extent of the facilities' contamination, and (3) how lessons learned from the response to the contamination could be used in future situations."
Source: Government Accountability Office (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: GAO-04-239. Large File: 1+ Mb.
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense
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14.
Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook. August 2004.
- From U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), the fifth edition of the "blue book" covers: the history of biological warfare and current threat; distinguishing between natural and intentional disease outbreaks; ten steps in the management of biological casualties on the battlefield; bacterial agents; viral agents; biological toxins; emerging infections and future biological weapons detection; personal protection; and decontamination. Appendices include: a glossary of medical terms; patient isolation precautions; BW agent characteristics; BW agent vaccines, prophylactics and therapeutics, medical sample collection for bio threat agents; specimens for laboratory diagnosis; BW agent laboratory identification; differential diagnosis - toxins vs. nerve agents; comparative lethality - toxins vs. chemical agents, aerosol toxicity in LD/50 vs quantity of toxin; references; Use of IND products; drug/vaccine considerations in special populations; emergency response contacts - FBI & public health. Fourth Edition.
Source: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) (All by Source | Source Website). Large File: 2.1+ Mb.
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Public Health :
Smallpox
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15.
Responding to Detection of Aerosolized Bacillus anthracis by Autonomous Detection Systems in the Workplace. April 2004.
- "This report provides guidelines in the following six areas: 1) response and consequence management planning, including the minimum components of a facility response plan; 2) immediate response and evacuation; 3) decontamination of potentially exposed workers to remove spores from clothing and skin and prevent introduction of B. anthracis into the worker's home and conveyances; 4) laboratory confirmation of an ADS signal; 5) steps for evaluating potentially contaminated environments; and 6) postexposure prophylaxis and follow-up."
Source: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Public Health
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16.
Bioterrorism: Public Health Response to Anthrax Incidents of 2001. October 2003.
- "In the fall of 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to news media personnel and congressional officials, leading to the first cases of anthrax infection related to an intentional release of anthrax in the United States. Outbreaks of anthrax infection were concentrated in six locations, or epicenters, in the country. An examination of the public health response to the anthrax incidents provides an important opportunity to apply lessons learned from that experience to enhance the nation's preparedness for bioterrorism."
Source: Government Accountability Office (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: GAO-04-152.
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Lessons Learned :
Proceedings - Congressional Hearings, Conferences, Seminars, Workshops, etc. :
Public Health
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17.
Bioterrorism: Public Health Response to Anthrax Incidents of 2001. October 2003.
- Due to interest in bioterrorism preparedness, this report reviewed the public health response to the 2001 anthrax incidents. The review determined what was learned from the experience that could help improve public health preparedness at the local and state levels, what was learned that could help improve public health preparedness at the federal level, and what steps have been taken to make those improvements.
Source: Government Accountability Office (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: GAO-04-152. Large File: 1+ Mb.
See Also -
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Emergency Management :
Lessons Learned :
Public Health
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18.
Homeland Insecurity: Building the Expertise to Defend America from Bioterrorism. July 2003.
- This report by the Partnership for Public Service (www.ourpublicservice.org), a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to excellence in civil service, describes the declining number of biodefense experts in the U.S. government. With many retirements and insufficient recruitment efforts, the shrinking number of federal geneticists, infectious disease specialists, and epidemiologists makes the nation more vulnerable to a biological attack. The report also discusses agricultural terrorism, the October 2001 anthrax attacks, and lessons from Dark Winter, a bioterrorism exercise cosponsored by MIPT.
Source: Partnership for Public Service (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Agricultural Terrorism :
Biological Terrorism, Weapons, Security and Defense :
Food Safety :
Homeland Security :
Lessons Learned :
Public Health :
Smallpox
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19.
U.S. Postal Service: Issues Associated with Anthrax Testing at the Wallingford Facility. May 2003.
- "In this testimony, GAO presents its preliminary findings concerning the test results for the Wallingford facility: (1) the collection of samples to detect anthrax, (2) the meaning of the test results, and (3) the communication of the test results to workers."
Source: Government Accountability Office (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: GAO-03-787T.
See Also -
Proceedings - Congressional Hearings, Conferences, Seminars, Workshops, etc.
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20.
U.S. Postal Service: Better Guidance Is Needed to Improve Communication Should Anthrax Contamination Occur in the Future. April 2003.
- This report addresses the lessons that can be learned from the anthrax contamination at the Southern Connecticut Processing and Distribution Center in Wallingford, Connecticut (the Wallingford facility).
Source: Government Accountability Office (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: GAO-03-316. Large File: 1+ Mb.
See Also -
Lessons Learned :
Public Health
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