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Reports
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1.
Iraqi Force Development: Conditions for Success, Consequences of Failure. September 2007.
- "There is no way to summarize Iraqi force development in simple terms. Iraq is already in a state of limited civil war and may well be escalating to the level of a major civil conflict. The current combination of insurgency, Sunni Arab versus Shi'ite Arab sectarian conflict, and Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily cause the collapse of the current political structure, leading to a Shi'ite or Shi'ite-Kurdish dominated government with strong local centers of power, and an ongoing fight with Iraq's Sunnis."
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Miscellaneous Resources
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2.
Iraq's Insurgency and Civil Violence: Developments through late August 2007. August 2007.
- The report examines the correlation of the US 'surge' attempt, the performance of Iraqi Security Forces, and the rise in tribal and sectarian extremism in relation to the level of violence in Iraq. The report gives a detailed account of regional developments, changes in the insurgency, post-conflict reconstruction and aid, and the effects of ongoing violence on the Iraqi people. In addition, the report also covers aspects relating to the support provided by outside governments to Iraqi insurgents in the forms of arms and sophisticated weapons.
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Military Issues
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3.
Prospects for Iraq's Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive. August 2007.
- "This assessment updates the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq entitled, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead; it has been prepared at the direction of the Director of National Intelligence in response to a request from the National Security Council. It provides the Intelligence Community's analysis of the status of the critical factors identified in the January Estimate that are driving Iraq's security and political trajectory. Using the January Estimate as a baseline, this update examines the prospects for progress on the security and national reconciliation fronts over the next six to
12 months."
Source: National Intelligence Council (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Miscellaneous Resources
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4.
Iraq's Sunni Insurgents: Looking beyond Al Qa'ida. July 2007.
- The report states that Al-Qa'ida represents only a fraction of the militant insurgents based in Iraq. The Mujihadeen Army in Iraq, the Islamic Army in Iraq, the Ansar Al-Sunnah Army, the Iraqi Resistance Movement, and the Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance are just a handful of the diverse Sunni insurgent base currently operating in Iraq. The report briefly analyzes the differing ideoligies of the groups, and examines insurgent attack patterns.
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Al Qaeda
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5.
Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan [Word Document]. April 2007.
- "In both Afghanistan and Iraq, security, governance and development instruments are unlikely by themselves to offer the solution to end the ongoing violence. Both countries increasingly serve as a magnet and spark for radical Islamists. While there is a need to employ such instruments towards wider objectives, it has not been made clear what those objectives are beyond winning the war on terror." This essay explores the methods that need to be implemented in order to be successful in counterinsurgency.
Source: U.S. Army War College (All by Source | Source Website).
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6.
Subversion and Insurgency. 2007.
- "This paper presents a set of case studies to explore the elements of subversion indepth. It discusses preliminary ideas for combating subversive activities in the context of the war against violent Islamic extremism and concludes with a discussion of how U.S. support for counter subversion within authoritarian regimes can conflict with other important U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as the promotion of human rights."
Source: RAND (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Lessons Learned :
National Strategies
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7.
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures. September 2006.
- "Since October 2001, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs, or roadside bombs) have been responsible for many of the more than 2,000 combat deaths in Iraq, and 178 combat deaths in Afghanistan.1 IEDs are hidden behind signs and guardrails, under roadside debris, or inside animal carcasses, and encounters with these bombs are becoming more numerous and deadly in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The threat includes vehicle-borne IEDs, in which extremists drive cars laden with explosives directly into a target. DOD efforts to counter IEDs have proven only marginally effective, and U.S. forces continue to be exposed to the threat at military checkpoints, or whenever on patrol. IEDs are increasingly being used in Afghanistan, and DOD reportedly is concerned that they might eventually be more widely used by other insurgents and
terrorists worldwide."
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), United States (All by Source).
See Also -
Lessons Learned :
Proceedings - Congressional Hearings, Conferences, Seminars, Workshops, etc.
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8.
Understanding Measures of Effectiveness in Counterinsurgency Operations. May 2006.
- "An examination of the theory, history, and doctrine of counterinsurgency operations is conducted to develop a general framework of an insurgency. An understanding of the general insurgency framework is then used to develop an operational design for counterinsurgency campaigns that applies logical lines of operations that are linked to the strategic end state."
Source: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (All by Source).
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9.
Using BATs, CATs, and RATs to defeat Transnational Terrorist and Control Ungoverned Space. May 2006.
- This report discusses counterinsurgency from a theoretical and empirical standpoint in order to help understand how the United States government assists partner nations in securing their territory through embassies and other assistance programs.
Source: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (All by Source). Report Number: AY-05-06.
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10.
Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: The Critical Problems the U.S. Must Face If Iraqi Forces Are to Do the Job. April 2006.
- The expanding civil conflict in Iraq arising from sectarian differences produces a dramatic need for a new strategy that aims at political conciliation and compromise. This report examines the current US strategy's inability to anticipate problems and change doctrine when they arise. The report also analyzes the areas of Iraqi politics, governance, security, economic development, and energy and oil in making recommendations to augment the current strategy.
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (All by Source | Source Website).
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11.
Iraq War and Lessons for Counterinsurgency. March 2006.
- This report discusses "an overview of both how the Iraqi insurgency has moved towards civil conflict from its inception in the spring of 2003 through the first months of 2006, and of the ways in which insurgent tactics and methods have changed over time."
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Miscellaneous Resources
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12.
Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence. February 2006.
- This statement, by John D. Negroponte, discusses: "Global jihadists, their fanatical ideology, and the civilized world's efforts to disrupt, dismantle and destroy their networks; The struggle of the Iraqi and Afghan people to assert their sovereignty over insurgency, terror, and extremism; WMD-related proliferation and two states of particular concern, Iran and North Korea; Issues of political instability and governance in all regions of the world that affect our ability to protect and advance our interests; and Globalization, emerging powers, and such transnational challenges as the geopolitics of energy, narcotrafficking, and possible pandemics."
Source: Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Intelligence and Intelligence Sharing :
Proceedings - Congressional Hearings, Conferences, Seminars, Workshops, etc. :
Weapons of Mass Destruction
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13.
Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency. December 2005.
- "In this new study, Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White argue that the best means of assessing the insurgency is by tackling its complexity head-on, examining its operational environment, evolving structure, various tactics, and the degree to which it has penetrated private and public institutions and won over "hearts and minds" in the Sunni Triangle. To support this approach, they offer numerous charts and graphs exposing trends that have permitted the insurgency to sustain itself and that could help defeat it. At its root, they argue, the insurgency is about power: who had it, who has it now, and who will have it in the future—with all that this would imply for U.S. withdrawal plans, the global war on terrorism, and efforts to promote stability and democracy in the Middle East."
Source: Washington Institute for Near East Policy (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Miscellaneous Resources :
National Security
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14.
Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency. December 2005.
- This report, by Sherifa Zuhur, discusses the "intensity and diversification of extremist efforts and outlines their 'new jihad' and its relationship to the regeneration of extremist leadership. She reviews 'lessons learned' with regard to Islamist extremist tactics, recruitment, and their relationship to a broader Islamic awakening which must be factored into the U.S. desire for democratization of the Middle East and the broader Islamic world."
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (All by Source | Source Website). Large File: 4.4+ Mb.
See Also -
Al Qaeda :
Lessons Learned
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15.
Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths. November 2005.
- This report, by Antulio J. Echevarria II, is "a critique of the theory of 4GW [Fourth Generation War], examining its faulty assumptions and the problems in its logic. He argues that the proponents of 4GW undermine their own credibility by subscribing to this bankrupt theory. If their aim is truly to create positive change, then they--and we--would be better off jettisoning the theory and retaining the traditional concept of insurgency, while modifying it to include the greater mobility and access afforded by globalization."
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Military Issues
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16.
Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War On Terrorism. November 2005.
- This report discusses "the problems common to the security forces of local allies that have fought or may soon fight insurgencies linked to al-Qa'ida."
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (All by Source | Source Website).
See Also -
Military Issues
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17.
Does Our Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat? September 2005.
- This testimony of Bruce Hoffman, presented before the House International Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, discusses the Al Qaeda movement today, the ongoing insurgency in Iraq and the GWOT [Global War on Terrorism] and realigning American counterterrorism strategy with the threat.
Source: RAND (All by Source | Source Website). Report Number: CT-250-1.
See Also -
Al Qaeda :
Proceedings - Congressional Hearings, Conferences, Seminars, Workshops, etc.
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18.
Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations. May 2005.
- This report discusses the history of Sri Lanka and provides insight into the Sri Lankan government's continuing conflict with the insurgent LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; AKA Tamil Tigers] as well as provides background information on the US government's relations with Sri Lanka and cooperation with Colombo in addressing the LTTE and their tactics.
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), United States (All by Source). Report Number: RL31707.
See Also -
Terrorist Events and Activities
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19.
Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq. April 2005.
- This report "offers insight into the breadth of Sunni Arab groups actively participating in the insurrection in Iraq and specifically examines the three broad categories of insurgents: secular/ideological, tribal, and Islamist. With the exception of the ultraradical Salafi and Wahhabi Islamists, this report finds, many rebels across these three classifications share common interests and do not sit so comfortably in any one grouping or category. This presents specific problems--and opportunities--for U.S. and coalition forces that, if handled correctly, could eventually lead to a rapprochement with some of the insurgents."
Source: United States Institute of Peace (All by Source | Source Website).
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20.
Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency. March 2005.
- "The primary thrust of this monograph is to explain the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or third generation gangs) to insurgency in terms of the instability it wreaks upon government and the concomitant challenge to state sovereignty. Although there are differences between gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated forms of urban insurgency. In these terms, these 'new' nonstate actors must eventually seize political power in order to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want. The common denominator that clearly links the gang phenomenon to insurgency is that the third generation gangs' and insurgents' ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries. As a consequence, the 'Duck Analogy' applies. Third generation gangs look like ducks, walk like ducks, and act like ducks--a peculiar breed, but ducks nevertheless! This monograph concludes with recommendations for the United States and other countries to focus security and assistance responses at the strategic level. The intent is to help leaders achieve strategic clarity and operate more effectively in the complex politically dominated, contemporary global security arena."
Source: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (All by Source | Source Website).
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