Report transcribed by Realtime Reporting.
MR. REIMER: When I started this morning, I mentioned that one of our objectives was to try to bring together people who write and teach about the social and political impacts of terrorism and also combine them with some of the responders who have to manage the consequences of terrorism.
During the breakout sessions, I had a chance to go into all four, and I know there were some very scholarly papers presented and some good discussion that took place in terms of the social and political impact of terrorism. Today, we are very fortunate to have someone who understands what it's like to respond to that type of crisis, and it really is my pleasure to introduce one of our own because we really in Oklahoma City welcome Sam Gonzales back. He's moved back here on a permanent basis and we're delighted to have him here.
Sam began his career in law enforcement almost 40 years ago and was in the Dallas police department. Started in 1963. He rose through the ranks to become executive assistant chief of police in Dallas. In August of 1990, he became the acting chief of police in Dallas and held that position until March of '91, when Oklahoma City hired him away from Dallas and he became the police chief in September of '91, and he held that position through '98. Obviously from '91 to '98 you know the type of things he had to deal with and certainly he was there in '95 when the Murrah building bombing took place.
Since May of '98, he has been working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has been very instrumental with the National Domestic Preparedness Office and being an advisor with them and has provided them a great deal of experience and expertise in terms of what the first responders really need in terms of equipment, planning and training.
Sam Gonzales is one of those people I respect very, very much. I don't know him that well. We met only a little while ago, but I respect him because of what he's done. I respect him because the people that I know respect him and have great admiration for what he has done, and so it's a real honor for me to be able to introduce to all of you, reintroduce to all of you Sam Gonzales. Sam, you're on.
MR. GONZALES:
Thank you very much and good afternoon. It's good to be back in Oklahoma City. We retired here, as the general said, in 1998 because of family, and went back to Dallas for a year and a half. My wife and I are both very, very excited about being back in Oklahoma City, a place that we have grown to love and a police department that is what I consider one of the finest in the United States.
As your program would have told you, the luncheon speaker today was supposed to be Mr. Tom Kuker. Tom is the current director of the National Domestic Preparedness Office. He is with the FBI. He is in transition, leaving that position, becoming a SAIC again in Albuquerque, New Mexico, so he was unable to attend. He did ask me and sent me his remarks and asked me if I would pass on his remarks about the status of the NDPO, where we are now and where we plan to go.
The Oklahoma City National Memorial is a poignant reminder of the event that occurred here five years ago, taking 168 lives and shattering the lives of their families and friends left behind. All of us, whether a public servant or a private citizen, whether an American or an international representative, have in some way been affected by that bombing. Many of us had to deal with the aftermath in person. Maybe you here today are among the emergency response personnel employed by Oklahoma City or maybe employed by the state or from the various federal agencies. You were a volunteer; you were from other communities in Oklahoma or from across the country. Whether you experienced the tragedy firsthand or are here because your community needs to focus on lessons learned, we all share a common interest in domestic preparedness and proactive measures which can be taken in this area.
Those of us with the responsibility for various aspects of preparedness among the federal, state and local agencies, as well as in private industry, all have that insecurity that no amount of preparedness in the areas of planning, training, and exercises is enough to address all the variables attributed to domestic terrorism; however, if we dedicate ourselves and our organizations to the pursuit of cooperative and collaborative efforts, with the objective of overcoming jurisdictional and mission-oriented prejudices, we can take solace in knowing that we are doing everything humanly possible to mitigate the effects of such a catastrophe, wherever and whenever it occurs again, and I think most of us have that dreaded feeling that it will occur again.
As many of you know, the National Domestic Preparedness Office was created by the Department of Justice to coordinate federal programs which support state and local emergency responder communities in the areas of weapons of mass destruction, related domestic preparedness, planning, training, exercises, equipment research and development, information-sharing and health and medical issues. It is a partnership of these two entities: the federal government and the emergency responder community upon which the NDPO is founded.
I appreciate the invitation to speak on behalf of Mr. Kuker today and take this opportunity to give you an update on the progress of the NDPO by describing some of our ongoing initiatives in the various program areas.
Despite the delay the NDPO has experienced this past fiscal year in obtaining Congressional authorization and funding, we have been able to make some strides in the area of information-sharing and outreach, as well as further refine our program planning initiatives.
The Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for Prevention of Terrorism has recently been enhanced through the naming of its first director, retired General Dennis Reimer. In the area of outreach, education and research, the NDPO applauds the Institute for its focus on encouraging the development of collaborative networks to deal with the threat of terrorism nationally and to focus on the causes and effects of terrorism.
The NDPO looks forward to utilizing the forum provided by the Institute for communications and collaboration among preparedness agencies, researchers, policy-makers and professionals.
This work has already begun. The terrorism committees from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the National Sheriffs Association, the National Emergency Management Association, and representatives from the public health community will meet here in May, late May, and early June, along with the recipients of federal research money. This conference will put together the first responder community along with the people who have received federal money to provide training, research and development for that same first responder community.
Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating was invited to share his experience recently in a conference of the FBI National Academy Associates. His remarks were focused on response to catastrophes, both natural and manmade. He stated that while we couldn't anticipate such an event as the bombing, we have to acknowledge that calamities will occur and reoccur. The challenge is to respond professionally, intelligently and sensibly.
What Mr. Keating experienced in the aftermath of the bombing as a public official and as a leader was the role of a spokesman to reassure the community, the state and the nation that we would make it through. He stated the key to getting through a crisis is to ensure that as a leader you have inserted competent, skilled individuals in critical response roles. Once you have competent players, the requirement then is to bring them together to war-game possible events. By war-gaming, Mr. Keating means pretend it will happen, because it will; therefore, planning for it is crucial.
Mr. Keating concluded his remarks by saying that competency and preparedness are 90 percent of what is required of a community in response to a catastrophe. If you're in a planning role, Mr. Keating asks that you remember to include political leaders in the process. He stated our role as leaders is not only to ask pertinent questions but also to provide answers.
The National Domestic Preparedness Office has taken the message of Mr. Keating and is building upon it with the incorporation of leaders in other communities to produce a video tape that will then be made available to everyone. The video is among the many outreach initiatives being pursued by the NDPO in support of state and local agencies.
Governor Keating's opinions are echoed by Governor George Pataki of New York, who when speaking on his state's Y2K preparedness activities, stressed that readiness is rooted in the partnership that exists between the government, the private sector and volunteer agencies. Governor Pataki is committed to making state government a more active member of that partnership. He reiterates that we must listen and learn from each other.
Another speaker featured in the video is Mr. Tom Ed McHugh, mayor of Baton Rouge, Louisiana who views terrorism as a new challenge to most communities and also stresses the need for building relationships with federal and state agencies. He states, "As a public official, when tragedy comes, someone will ask the question: Why were we not prepared? It is worth the time and effort to take the opportunity to make the community ready."
Almost two years ago, Luther Fincher, chief of the Charlotte Fire Department and the current president of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, spoke before the senate appropriations subcommittee on labor, health and human services, education and related agencies. During his testimony, he stated, "Our customers have a very high expectation of government in terrorist situations and they demand extraordinary effort."
Congress and the federal government clearly understand the role of the local responder. According to the Attorney General, the NDPO will be a conduit through which state and local communities can voice their concerns. One mode of direct contact between the NDPO and the responder community is through our monthly chat sessions conducted through the law enforcement on line, LEO. One objective from Washington, D.C., is to ensure that the public health community is made aware of their ability to join LEO. We count on the FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinators and other federal coordinators to get the word out. As a result, the number of applicants from the medical community, including hospitals, is dramatically increasing. Our most recent chat session held on March 29th included participation by representatives of the Chicago area local emergency management and FBI WMD coordinators from around the country. Among the topics of discussion were how the on-scene commander's guide was being utilized, NDPO information bulletins and distribution of federal grant money.
Just for your information, the next chat session will be on April 26th at 2:00 p.m., and topics for discussion may be forwarded to the NDPO at http://leo.gov.
The monthly chat session is one application of what the NDPO is pursuing in its development of a common communications link or called a CCL. When the CCL is complete it will provide a user directory sorted by state, and utilizing LAW ENFORCEMENT ONLINE to link local users with the web pages of federal, state and association partners. It will allow registered users access to computer-based conferencing, an NDPO help line and will one day be expanded into wireless communications, including wireless advisories and internet-based telephone and video conferencing.
Another method of outreach and information exchange employed by the NDPO is the publication of our monthly newsletter
The Beacon which is also available via the Internet LEO website. We are especially interested in finding topics for
The Beacon that highlight communities in action. An upcoming issue will focus on Oklahoma's planning efforts in public health and with the medical community. Oklahoma's domestic preparedness training began in December of 1998 and inadvertently helped the health and medical communities prepare for last winter's increase in flu cases seen at hospitals.
The area's lead medics had gone through domestic preparedness training and exercises and were made aware that one of the early warning signs of a potential bioterrorist event is a sudden increase in flu-like cases. In addition, the area's largest patient transport service, the Emergency Medical Services Authority, EMSA, provides protocols to its medics that include a section on WMD terrorism and a subsection on bioterrorism that states, "EMS personnel must be aware that they may hold the key to early identification of biological terrorist attack."
When there was an increase in flu cases that winter, local EMS personnel knew something was going on. While not anywhere near the scope of damage that was caused by the last tornado, the winter flu outbreak did cause problems. Local medical resources were quickly extended beyond capability. Beginning Christmas Eve, emergency departments began filling up. The peak of the outbreak saw EMSA's patient transports increase from an average of 625 a week to 825 a week. Waiting times at hospitals extended to over six hours. Intensive care units filled up, and hospitals sought divert status.
Eventually illnesses among health care workers also increased. Local health and medical authorities treated the outbreak as naturally occurring but larger than usual. EMSA medics had started reporting to their supervisors many cases with similar symptoms. The supervisors contacted the coordinator of the Metropolitan Medical Response Systems, the MMRS, who notified the state epidemiologist, Oklahoma City's emergency planning coordinator, the fire chief and the county public health director. Though these calls were not to sound a WMD alert, the recipients of the calls were all members of the area's WMD work group, and they had developed a close working relationship with each other. A plan of action was discussed and lab samples were sent to the state's public health department.
On December 28th, only a few days from the time that the earliest cases were reported, the state epidemiologist confirmed that the cause of the outbreak was a common variety of the influenza virus that CDC had previously decided to target for prevention with a flu vaccine. The state's Department of Health issued a press release, recommended vaccinations, especially for the vulnerable population, such as seniors and individuals with long-standing illnesses. The press release also recommended which antivirals to use against the flu and how to locate vaccination centers.
Other planning efforts include development of decontamination plans for the area's hospitals and a recent media forum. The forum informed the media about the MMRS and ongoing WMD planning processes, identified public information officers for further contact, and addressed the sensitivity and nature of the process and the significance of limiting publicity that might influence the increase of hoaxes.
Oklahoma's WMD and other disaster-planning experience point to three fundamental lessons: communications, coordination and consistency. Last year's flu outbreak shows how important it is to train EMS personnel to communicate observations. They have front-line information. Also vital to health and medical response in Oklahoma was coordination and keeping internal communications constant with all components.
The foundation was built for this coordination because the hospitals were involved and found a way to make WMD a priority in their planning and operations. Their planning moved them rapidly from beyond discussions to the functional operations.
It is noteworthy that our nation's public health and medical community continues to take a global approach to the surveillance of biological threats. One recent incident this year involved reports of an outbreak of the smallpox virus in Katmandu, Nepal. Dr. Scott Lillibridge, director of the CDC's bioterrorism response program, immediately contacted the WMD's operations unit to keep it appraised of developments and to corroborate information through the health medical community.
In under two hours, it was determined that the reports of smallpox were the results of a mistranslation by an English newspaper of an actual outbreak of the measles. Thank goodness.
Besides information-sharing, it became clear to the NDPO during our development phase that public health was contained in all of the program areas: planning, training, research and development, and it was so important that the NDPO created a new program area separately just for the medical community.
Representatives of the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Emergency Preparedness and the Centers for Disease Control have participated recently in numerous NDPO projects including the development of the On-Scene Commander's Guide for Responding To Biological and Chemical Threats.
In directing our program initiatives, we have made every effort to be all-inclusive with regard to all response disciplines, whether it is a matter of who is subscribing to our website or who constitutes our state and local advisory group.
In response to our first issue of
The Beacon, we received an emotional letter from a dispatcher of a small rural community in Tennessee. She felt that 911 dispatchers were not regarded as the first responders that they are and, that being from a very small police department, they would not receive any federal funding to help them with training. The NDPO relies on the input of our nation's stakeholders from the emergency response community, whether positive or negative. The concerns of the stakeholders are what will drive its policy and program direction.
Another concern voiced by Chief Luther Fincher two years ago was that there is an urgent need for all federal agencies which respond to emergencies to adopt the National Fire Academy's Incident Control System. Noting that when federal assets arrive at an incident, the ICS is already in place, and they need to be plugged into the ICS by the incident commander.
This sentiment is a popular one among local responders. Over the past year, the NDPO has coordinated meetings between the federal partners, the National Fire Academy, the Emergency Management Institute, and state and local agencies to address that issue.
Besides federal agency participation, it included senior fire officials from across the nation who attended a course entitled "Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations and Emergency Management." The daylong exercise assessed new protocols that were developed to integrate federal resources with a local command structure at a weapons-of-mass-destruction incident site. These protocols were developed as a result of concerns based by the emergency response community that the widely used ICS system was incompatible with the crisis management structure of the FBI's Joint Operation Center, or the JOC. The JOC is employed for federal crisis management in response to terrorism that occurs domestically.
The exercise was successful in illustrating that the ICS, in conjunction with the JOC, can effectively address command and control issues that may arise during such an incident, and the integration does not change existing federal or state critical incident management systems. The training staff at the NFA, the National Fire Academy, and the attending students assessed this part of the course to be a valuable learning experience for all participants.
In working the JOC and ICS issue, it was of paramount importance for the NDPO that we build and improve upon existing structures and not create new ones. The Local Emergency Planning Committees, LEPCs, are an example of just that, where the NDPO wanted to foster collaborative planning efforts at the local level aimed at a WMD terrorism response. It recognized the LEPC as an overarching mechanism in many places in the country that could achieve just that.
Most of you know it, but since 1986 the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act has required that every community develop an emergency plan that prepares for the accidental release of extremely hazardous substances and, should one occur, make provisions for the rapid response to protect the community. These existing plans, which are developed by LEPCs, should be updated to incorporate planning and response to deliberate chemical releases that are the hallmark of terrorist incidents.
Most people would not make the connection between a coordinated national anti-terrorism program and a mission of an LEPC, but when you examine the subject a little more closely, the connection becomes quite clear. LEPCs are critical to the success of a community's right to know and play a vital role in helping the public emergency responders and others understand chemical information, other environmental data and what to do if a terrorist incident occurs.
Given the increased attention on the threat of terrorism, LEPCs continue to build upon the existing hazardous substance in all emergency response programs to become better prepared to respond to a terrorist incident. In fact, a recent survey cited by the George Washington University showed that 40 percent of the nation's 3200 LEPCs have already incorporated planning and response to deliberate chemical releases by terrorists into their emergency plans.
Because of the public's knowledge about the local role in preparing for and responding to emergencies involving chemicals and biological agents that could be a component of a weapon of mass destruction, I believe that members of the public seeking information about these hazards in their community would likely seek such information and advice from their LEPCs.
One of the mottos at the NDPO is: By and for, first responders.
This has become a standard in our monthly newspaper,
The Beacon. It also is what we hope to achieve in the makeup of that office. We all recognize that federal cooperation is just the first step, and that participation by state and local authorities is critical to the success of the national office. For this very reason, we intend that once funding is available, that one-third of the staff of the NDPO will come from the state and local areas.
Currently, we have on board three employees: Gerald Wheeler, who was a lieutenant with the Michigan state police in charge of their Haz-Mat training, is on board and represents the emergency management arena. Battalion Chief Bill Terry of the Prince George's County Fire Department represents EMS and the fire service, and I, as the former chief of police in Oklahoma City, represent law enforcement. Incorporating all disciplines into planning each step is crucial to forming a coordinated federal, state and local strategy and partnership within each state.
To assist in this process, the NDPO has published a planning guide that is consistent with FEMA's preparedness principles, which are already familiar to the state planners. Jerry Wheeler and I go around the country, and we've probably made 40 trips last year out of Washington, D.C., helping local communities set up community response systems, community response plans, based on logistical lessons learned in Oklahoma City, and that program is an integral part of NDPO's outreach program and our efforts to attain one-on-one contacts with state and local communities for planning assistance.
In addition to the experts that are there on a day-to-day basis, the NDPO is designed to have a state and local advisory group. The advisory group will offer advice and recommendations based on both state and local perspectives and from a wide range of professional outlooks.
It is envisioned that this group will periodically review and comment on the direction of the NDPO and will serve to guide the development and delivery of more effective federal programs for emergency responders. The advisory group is to be appointed by the Attorney General, will have approximately 30 members, with representatives from fire rescue, Haz-Mat, emergency, medical and health services, law enforcement, emergency management and state and local governments. And by the way, our funding has delayed the start of the state and local advisory group as well.
Within NDPO's training program area, a compendium of WMD training courses available to the emergency response community has been made available. The compendium is designed to assist state and local managers in selecting the training opportunities that are best suited for their responders, and there is a website where you can access this. The website is
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/.
In response to concern for the standardization of federal training courses, the NDPO has received concurrence from its federal partners for the establishment of a curriculum review panel to ensure federal training programs appropriately comply with the national standards for quality assurance, trying to make sure that if a federal program comes to you, that it does meet the standards that you would expect it to meet. This curriculum review panel is just one of many initiatives that would be pursued in a development of overall national strategy for WMD planning and training.
In the area of equipment and research, the NDPO has facilitated the establishment and distribution of an SEL, a standardized equipment list, that suggests the types of equipment that are necessary for safe and effective responses. This list has been incorporated into the grant application kits used by the Office of Justice Programs. It has been proposed that the NDPO could serve as a clearinghouse for product information provided by private vendors and testing data for approved testing facilities to promote synergy and avoid costly duplication in the effort of federal research and development.
The standardized equipment list is a product of the Interagency Board, the IAB, or equipment standardization and interoperability and is co-chaired by the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice.
Within the exercise program area, the NDPO maintains a list of all planned federal WMD exercises that are suitable for participation by state and local authorities. Our goal is to provide improved interagency notification and communications of WMD exercises on a long-term basis. The NDPO will disseminate exercise schedule updates through the single point of contact identified by the state governors as well as through a secure website.
As the NDPO exercise program progresses, it will also work to create a database of state WMD exercises being conducted and apply the lessons learned, after action tracking system to provide feedback to the NDPO. The after action tracking system already adopted by the federal agencies will provide a method of identifying vulnerabilities and formulating recommendations to address them. The after action tracking system of lessons learned will provide the capabilities of emergency responders and health care professionals to respond to actual incidents.
As you've heard, there is a lot going on at the NDPO. There is a lot that they still need to do, that we still need to do, a lot that we would still like to accomplish. As any new national office, we've had some growing pains; things have been slow. It took us a year to get approved by the appropriations committee. We were then funded with $6 million out of the existing FBI's budget. The FBI, like most of the federal agencies this year, are really in a tight spot, so the FBI does not really have $6 million to just give to the NDPO to start doing the things that we need to do.
The outreach areas that we've talked about, we will continue to do and continue to move forward with the WMD training, continue to update the standardized equipment list and to do those things we can do and hopefully this October, when the federal budget comes out again, there will be new program money for the NDPO to continue.
At this time, General, I would be glad to respond to any questions that you may have about the NDPO and, as well as I can, the status of the NDPO.